讲座主题：The Dynamics of Verification when Searching for Quality

主讲嘉宾：李子豪 哥伦比亚大学 在读博士生

讲座时间：2026年6月25日周四15：00

讲座地点：hbs02红宝石线路学院南路校区中财大厦二层案例教室2

嘉宾简介：李子豪，哥伦比亚大学经济学博士生，导师为 Yeon-Koo Che 教授和刘庆民教授（AER联合主编）。其研究方向为微观经济理论、动态博弈、信息经济学与机制设计。先后就读于芝加哥大学、普林斯顿大学，现于哥伦比亚大学攻读博士学位。

李子豪的研究关注动态经济环境中的信息、学习与激励问题。其与 Jonathan A.Libgober合作的论文 “The Dynamics of Verification when Searching for Quality” 即将发表于 Review of Economic Studies。李子豪也曾担任 American Economic Review 和 RAND Journal of Economics 审稿人。

内容摘要：An agent samples projects over time, observing quality for each, while a principal can select at most one. The principal values quality, whereas the agent only wants a project chosen. Transfers are unavailable, but the principal can verify quality by paying a cost. We fully characterize the dynamics of verification by deter-mining optimal mechanisms for this problem. With a low verification cost and a long horizon, the optimal mechanism involves a deterministic selection rule that initially discriminates on quality but chooses a project irrespective of its quality at a deadline. Verification occurs with an intermediate probability before the deadline, declining over time. We show how these conclusions change if the verification cost is high or the horizon is short, and under certain forms of imperfect commitment. Our analysis provides guidelines on how dynamics interact with the benefits of verification.